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Investment banks develop new securities permanently even when their com-
petitors can imitate them almost immediately and at signi…cantly smaller
development costs. Using data of all the new issues of Equity Linked and
Derivative Securities since 1985 compiled by SDC, and …rm …nancial data
from COMPUSTAT, I test if innovators have a demand advantage over the
imitators when they compete to underwrite new issues using innovative cor-
porate products. If the innovator has private information about the innova-
tion, his own variety of the security may be better valued than the imitators’
varieties by the issuers. I estimate the issuers’ demand for the banker’s un-
derwriting service across di¤erent varieties of equity-linked securities. Using
a nested-logit model of discrete choice I …nd that, ceteris paribus, the de-
mand for innovators’ varieties is larger than for imitators’. I also …nd that
this demand advantage is decreasing in time, suggesting that imitators learn
from observing deals made in the past by the innovator and by themselves.
The initial innovator’s advantage is larger for securities that appear later in
a sequence of innovations but it diminishes faster.
JEL classi…cation: G24, C25, L89.
Keywords: Financial Innovation, Investment Banking, Underwriting,
First-Mover Advanatges, Demand Estimation.1 Introduction
The last twenty years have witnessed the introduction of a remarkable num-
ber of innovations in corporate securities.1 Most of these have been brought
about by investment banks through the business of underwriting new cor-
porate issues. It is also remarkable that investment banks have found it
pro…table to develop new securities even when their competitors have been
able to imitate them almost immediately and at signi…cantly smaller de-
velopment costs. The empirical evidence so far has suggested that, despite
these disadvantages, innovators are compensated with the largest share of
the underwriting market. In this paper I estimate the demand of …rms for
the underwriting services of investment banks that use innovative corporate
products. This will allowme tomeasure thedi¤erent value to…rms from rais-
ing money using a security engineered by an innovator or an imitator and
thus explain the innovator’s market share advantage. The dynamic setup of
the econometric model will allow a characterization of this advantage over
time and shed light on the question of what makes innovators have a demand
advantage over imitators.
Product innovation in …nance is particularly interesting because innova-
tors face many disadvantages. Tufano (1989) provides evidence showing that
imitationoccurs shortly after the…rst issue ofanewsecurity, leavingvirtually
no time for innovators to be the sole underwriters for that new type of secu-
rity. He also observes that the development cost is signi…cantly smaller for
imitators than for innovators. Further, the design of new securities is rapidly
revealed to competing banks because of SEC rules of disclosure. Most strik-
ingly, imitation cannot be precluded by any form of legal protection, i.e.,
patents.
In his seminal contribution, Tufano (1989) observes that what compen-
sates innovators for these disadvantages is the largest share of the market for
underwriting corporate new issues: given a security, the bank that creates
it is able to underwrite more capital than its largest imitator over all the
security’s history. Why innovators are able to have such an unchallenged
lead in these markets is perhaps the …rst question that this evidence raises.
This paper takes the …rst step towards answering the question empirically.
For that purpose I model the choice of a …rm that needs to raise money
externally through the issue of a security. This …rm has to choose the type
of security to be used and the bank that will underwrite it. Aggregating the
choices of all the …rms that need to make an o¤ering, the model predicts the
1For a list of innovations in corporate securities until 1991, and a description of some
of them, see Finnerty (1992). All innovations in equity-linked and derivative corporate
securities until March 2001 are listed in this paper.
1market shares of underwriting by di¤erent banks using di¤erent securities
conditional, among other things, on the characteristics of the banks (e.g.,
if they are imitators or innovators). Thus, after estimating this model, we
can test whether innovators have an advantage because their security is more
valuable to issuers.
This paper introduces two features that allow us to get a better descrip-
tion ofthe facts of…nancial innovation. One ofthem is theuse ofa framework
ofdi¤erentiatedproductsto model and estimate the demandfor underwriting
services. An inspection of recent innovations in corporate products suggests
clearly that di¤erent securities are created to target di¤erent types of issuers
or investors. For example, two similar debt products that tie the repay-
ment of the principal to the performance of other indices provide di¤erent
hedging devices to investors: the Stock Market Annual Reset Term Notes
(SMARTs) are corporate bonds that pay a capped ‡oating rate that is tied
to the American Stock Exchange Oil Stocks Index while the Currency Pro-
tected Notes (CPNs) are bonds that pay a ‡oating rate that is inversely tied
to the Canadian six-month bankers acceptance rate. By taking into account
the location of securities in a product space, it is possible to identify con-
sistently a demand function for underwriting that depends on the price of
underwriting (the underwriting spread).2 This is possible because we can
associate the variation in market shares with the variation in underwriting
spreads of varieties of the same security by di¤erent banks, and the variation
in underwriting spreads of similar varieties which can be close substitutes.3
The other feature is that this study focuses also on the dynamic pattern
of market shares. Instead of comparing the market shares of innovators and
imitators over the whole history of a given innovation, I observe them over
time and estimate the innovator’s demand advantage accordingly. This will
reveal whether the innovator’s advantage is preserved steadily through the
life cycle of the security or if imitators catch up with (or continue to fall
behind) innovators. This dynamic setup also allows a comparison between
the demands for sequences of securities. In fact, most securities appear se-
quentially, later ones as improvements of earlier ones. It appears that the life
cycle of a security ends when an innovation that modi…es the older design is
introduced.
The empirical …nance literature has not yet addressed extensively the
2The underwriting spead is the fee charged by an investment bank or a syndicate, equal
to the di¤erence between the gross sales to investors and the net proceeds received by the
issuer.
3Tufano’s study, for example, compares spreads only between banks issuing the same
security. In that sense, it is not a demand estimation for the underwriting services of
banks across di¤erent securities.
2question of why innovators have advantages over imitators. In fact, most
authors have examined extensively the causes of the demand for innovative
securities. The focus has been on trying toexplainwhat made eachparticular
innovation attractive to investors or issuers but not on why it is privately
pro…table to develop such instruments. Miller (1986), for example, argues
that the major impulse to …nancial innovations between the sixties and the
eighties came from ever changing tax codes and regulations that brought
about pro…t opportunities (e.g., tax money saved) through the design of new
…nancial products that circumvented these laws.4
Not much work has been done, though, to try to solve the puzzle of why
an unpatentable innovation is worth its R&D expenditure if imitation is less
costly and immediate. In particular, not much has been said about what
gives innovators an advantage over imitators. On one hand, some authors
have tried toexplainTufano’s stylizedfacts atthe theoretical level by arguing
that innovators are infra-marginal competitors, i.e., that have lower marginal
costs than imitators. By moving …rst, innovators may face lower search costs
of identifying potential issuers and investors (Allen and Gale, 1994, Chapter
4) or lower average marketing costs if there is lumpiness in the set up costs of
marketing networks (Ross, 1989) or if innovation signals skill and creativity
credibly (Tufano, 1989). On the other hand, Battacharyya andNanda (2000)
provide a model in which the innovator is able to appropriate the value of
its innovation and pro…t from it despite being imitated if it is costly for its
clients to switch to other underwriters.5;6
By contrast with these views, I analyze the possibility that the asymme-
try between innovators and imitators is on the information owned by these
two types of banks. If some of the information that innovators have about
the security remains private, a larger proportion of the R&D added value
can be appropriated. In other words, the innovator can pro…t because it is
imitated imperfectly. This possibility was explored in a theoretical paper by
Herrera and Schroth (2000). In it, innovators of derivatives that move one
period in advance receive private informative signals from their clients or the
4Tufano (1995) and Finnerty (1992) also describe the reasons for the appearance of the
most important innovations between 1830 and 1930 and since the 1970s, respectively.
5According to anecdotal evidence gathered by Naslund (1986), though, …rms usually
turn to the services of expert issuers of innovative products, i.e., innovators, even if they
used another bank for other services. This evidence comes from the testimonies of twenty
…nancial product developers in New York.
6Black and Silber (1986) also study …rst-mover advantages in …nance but they focus
in futures exchanges as the innovators, not in investment banks. They claim that futures
exchanges that develop new contracts have the advantage that they provide liquidity for
investors earlier than the competing exchanges so they are able to attract agents that have
to choose where to trade.
3market. This allows them to o¤er deals that are more attractive to …rms
than what imitators can o¤er. For recent innovations in corporate securi-
ties, it is possible that imitation is imperfect. Equity-Linked securities and
other derivative corporate products are sophisticated securities, speci…ed by
many parameters, some of which vary from deal to deal. Thus, it is possible
that imitators cannot reverse-engineer perfectly the observed new securities
from only a few deals. For example, the Equity-Linked Note (ELK) was
the …rst debt product to tie the repayment of principal to the stock price
of another publicly traded company. The optimal choice of the stock of the
company to tie the notes to is observable but the knowledge of what stocks
are optimal for di¤erent issuers or investors is a private component of R&D.
Imitators that want to underwrite issues of ELKs for a potential client may
know how to structure such instruments, but may not know exactly, from
what is observable, what stock to choose to tie the repayment of the debt of
their client.
Using data on all the new issues of equity-linked and corporate deriva-
tive securities, the (qualitative) results of the estimation of the demand for
underwriting services can be summarized as follows:
² the demand for underwriting services using this type of securities is
sensitive to the underwriting spread (i.e., its price);
² on average, the …rms’ demand for an innovator’s variety of the security
is bigger than the one for imitators;
² this di¤erence disappears during the security’s life cycle, so imitators
catch up with innovators;
² imitators catch up with innovators faster if securities are later improve-
ments on past innovations.
Thus, this paper provides the …rst empirical test that the advantage to
innovators may come from a bigger demand for the innovators’ products.
The dynamic patterns of competition it identi…es are consistent with the
predictions of Van Horne (1985) when imitators enter the market.7 They
are also consistent with the hypothesis that the advantage to innovators is
superior information that allows them to engineer their securities better than
imitators.
In the next section of the paper I describe the data set I use and present
some preliminary results that motivate the assumptions of the model I will
7Kanemasu, Litzenberger and Rolfo (1986) observe the same pattern for the case of
stripped treasury securities.
4take to the data later. In Section 3 I develop the model that will allow me
to characterize the preferences of …rms for the di¤erent types of underwriters
(innovators and imitators). In the theory subsection I present the formal
setup for the discrete-choice decision problem of …rms. I show that …rms
shouldderiveadditionalvalueif they chose aninnovator rather than imitators
as their underwriter. The rest of the section explains how this conjecture
will be tested using multinomial logit and nested logit models of demand. In
Section 4 I present the results of the estimation and Section 5 summarizes
the main claims of the paper.
2 Some Preliminary Evidence
The data used in this research is obtained from the Securities Data Com-
pany’s online databases of …nancial transactions. I use all the private and
public o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative corporate securities in the
New Issues database and record as many details of the o¤er as possible: the
name of the issuer, the principal issued, the name of the underwriter, the un-
derwriter’s fees (underwriting spread), and details of the security, like o¤ered
yield to maturity, average life, spread of coupon over treasury notes, call op-
tions, etc. I merge this data set with the quarterly COMPUSTAT database
(using six digit CUSIP numbers) to have …nancial information about the
issuer.
In his study, Tufano (1989) uses all types of securities between 1974 and
1986. Here I restrict the sample to equity-linked securities because this type
…ts better the motivation that …rst-mover advantages come from information
asymmetries between underwriters. This type of securities are complex and
underwriters have to choose many parameters to engineer such deals (In
Table 1 I show the relative size of this market). Variations on mortgage
backed products, for example, may be already too familiar to investment
banks to hide something in their structure to imitators.
Below I describe some important facts observed for this type of securities.
I pay particular attention to the evolution of market shares in the markets
of initial o¤erings.
The …rst thing to realize is that all the securities in our sample can be
classi…ed into groups. The SDC database identi…es 50 di¤erent types of new
equity-linkedorderivativecorporatesecurities but acloser look indicates that
some of these securities are related to each other in terms of their structure
and purpose. For example, MIPS and TOPRS are instruments used by
issuers to deduct debt interest payments from their taxable income, but the
former areissuedby a limited liability company whilethe latter by a specially
5conformed business trust.8 To classify all the 50 corporate products in the
SDC database I have relied on the experts’ opinion about the uses of these
products for corporations and investors.9 I found eleven distinct categories,
which I summarize in Table 2. For the rest of the paper I will refer to these
categories as “groups” or “families” of securities interchangeably.
I will refer to each one of these securities as an innovation, since for
each one there is a unique feature that distinguishes it from everything that
already existed. However, depending on the group they are in and the order
in which they appeared, I will assign to each security a generation number.
For example, since MIPS were the …rst tax advantage preferred debt, I will
call them the …rst generation of this family, and TOPRS the fourth.
I follow Tufano’s (1989) criterion to de…ne the innovator of a security
as the underwriter of the …rst public o¤er using that security. Similar to
what Tufano found, for equity-linked corporate securities we do observe that
innovators have an edge over imitators in terms of market shares. Only 18
of the 50 products are imitated. In 13 of these, innovators lead in principal
underwritten, and in 15 they lead in number of new issues. Also, imitation
was fast: for 10 of these securities, the second underwriting deal was made
by an imitator (see Table 3).
In this paper I want to study why innovators have a competitive advan-
tage over imitators. In particular, I want to test if issuers have stronger
preferences for innovators than imitators as the underwriter of the o¤er. To
choose an appropriate framework to study the demand for the underwriter
of the issue it is worth examining the dynamics of the market for a new issue
within each security and within each family. In Figures 1 and 2 I show the
total quarterly principal underwritten by investment banks using the most
important securities of two families. As we can see, each security seems to
be popular for a certain period of time until a next generation appears and
leads the market for issues of that group.
Another interesting feature for some families is that the market share
advantage of innovators over imitators seems to be bigger in the early gener-
ations. In…gures 3through 5 I showthe evolution intime of the accumulated
underwritten principal using a given security. Each …gure represents a gener-
ation of the same family (convertible preferred stocks). For later generations,
imitators end up accumulating a larger principal relative to the innovator.
8See Pratt (1995) for a detailed comparison of MIPS and TOPRS.
9For every product I have compiled articles in Investment Dealers’ Digest, American
Banker, Dow Jones Newswires and others found using the ABI Search Engine. For every
one I was able to …nd a description of the product, and a reference to an older product
which was similar to it. I am especially indebted to Tom Pratt, who writes a descriptive
article of almost every corporate security invented.
6In some cases the innovator is overtaken. A similar feature is observed in the
family of index-tied principal appreciation securities (…gures 6 and 7). It is
less clear, though, if this is true for other families, like the tax-advantage debt
or equity products. On average, still, it seems the innovators’s advantage is
weaker on late generations: Table 4 shows the average ratios of principal un-
derwrittenby imitators relative toprincipal underwritten by innovators. The
ratio for …rst generation securities is half the ratio that includes all imitated
securities.
The evidence above suggests that innovators seem to have an advantage
over imitators that is stronger for earlier generations of securities within the
family. Further inspection suggests that the appropriate framework to ana-
lyze the securities in this sample may be one of di¤erentiated products: it
is clear from an inspection of the de…nition of the 50 securities that these
corporate products o¤er di¤erent bene…ts to issuers or investors. Some pro-
vide a tax-advantage, others provide a hedge against the risk of defaulting
on debt. Interestingly, within imitated securities there seems to be di¤erenti-
ation across underwriters. Some of the characteristics of the same securities
(e.g., yield, o¤er to yield at maturity, years of call option protection, etc.)
di¤er signi…cantly across the banks that underwrote the o¤er (Table 5). An-
other interesting fact is that the within-variety variation for some of these
characteristics is smaller for imitators than for the innovator (Table 6). The
price of underwriting, i.e., the underwriting spread, does not seem to di¤er
signi…cantly, although the within security sample mean of the underwriting
fee for innovators is larger than for imitators (Table 7).
I will interpret this evidence as I present the econometric model and as I
discuss the results of the econometric estimation. What I conclude from this
evidence is that a useful model to describe competition between investment
banks to underwrite corporate issues using this type of securities must be
one of product di¤erentiation in an oligopolistic industry. Di¤erentiation
occurs at the underwriters level, where innovators are distinguished from
their imitators. Thus, from nowon Iwill call a variety adistinct combination
of a security and an underwriter.
3 The Model
3.1 Theory
The model I present below is built to illustrate the decision making process
of …rms that want to raise capital and have to choose an appropriate security
and the best underwriter, that is, the investment bank or “book-manager”
7that will engineer the security and sell it. I will use a stylized model of …rms’
preferences and underwriters’ information to …nd the demand for underwrit-
ing services by the di¤erent banks using their variety. The objective is to
motivate a reduced form that can then be taken to the data and will allow
us to test if those underwriters that invented the security have an advantage
over the other underwriters that engineered the same security for their clients
(the imitators). In particular, the model shows that …rms will place a higher
value to underwriting deals made with innovators than imitators.
It is worth to point out that the ultimate source of the innovator’s advan-
tage, the information asymmetry, is taken as given in this paper. The model
that follows illustrates how the asymmetry is built into the demand function
and what would be the empirical implications.10
3.1.1 The Setup
Firms that want to raise capital, the issuers, demand underwriting services
from investment banks. These banks compete to underwrite the issue of a
corporate security, and for this they o¤er di¤erentiated products: debt or
equity types of deals that o¤er investors di¤erent payo¤ schedules, horizons,
call options, convertibility possibilities, etc. Thus, they compete for issuers
that could use a non-standard variety of …nancial instruments. I formalize
this setup below.
A…rmthat needs toissuea securitytoraise capital is indexedby i 2 I: At
a given period, there is a set of varieties of instruments, J =f1;2;:::;Jg from
whichit can choose one. Letg be anindex for groups ofvarieties, g = 1;:::;G;
suchthat G · J andlet there be a partition G =fJ1;J2;:::;JGg of J so that
each set Jg contains those varieties which are closer to each other in terms of
their characteristics. In this setup, for example, if consumers were choosing
models and brands of a car then a set Jg would contain all brands of, say,
Sport Utility Vehicles and some other set, Jh; would contain all brands of
compact models.
In our case, the groups in G are securities that have the same name, e.g.,
PERCS, LYONS or TOPRS and each variety would be determined by the
name ofthe bank that underwrote the issue, e.g., PERCS by Morgan Stanley
10We can …nd some attempts in the literature to endogeneize the advantage of an in-
novator over its imitators. Herrera and Schroth (2000) provide a model that explains
why innovators of derivatives acquire superior information over competitors. In a di¤erent
perspective, Black and Silber (1986) derive an advantage to pionnering exchanges that
establish liquidity early and Allen and Gale (1994, Chapter 4) show how …rst-movers can
preempt imitation choosing their initial capacity as a Stackelberg leader.
8or PERCS by Merrill Lynch.11 Let b represent an underwriter in the set of
banks, B.
The …rm chooses one security and one underwriter among those that o¤er
that security. A variety j 2 J is given by a unique (b;g) combination. Let
uij be the value to …rm i of choosing the variety, j: The setupfor this decision
is illustrated in Figure 8.
The utility function uij is central to this paper since it is the function
whose parameters I will estimate using the data. I will characterize this
function when I derive the preferences of issuers for underwriters that are
innovators and underwriters that are imitators. The empirical literature
that deals with the estimation of preference parameters in models of discrete
choice uses special cases of the general speci…cations of linear preferences
by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) or Anderson et. al. (1989). In these studies,
agents value a product accordingto a weighted sum of its components. These
components, in general, are functions of the observable characteristics of the
product. We shall see, below, how this structure is particularly appropriate
for our study.
3.1.2 Preferences of Firms
In a typical underwriting deal of equity-linked or derivative corporate secu-
rities the …rm will issue a security engineered by the underwriter. The …rm
has preferences over the set of possible structures for that security. I will
de…ne the underwriting deal as a combination of a vector of characteristics
and an underwriting fee. Let µ 2 £ ½ <m be this vector, and p the fee.
De…nition 1 An underwriting deal between a bank b 2 B and a …rm i 2 I
is fully characterized by fj;i;µ;pg:
The vector of characteristics could include, for example, the premium
over dividend paid by commonstock, the date of maturity of the security, the
number of periods this security is protected from a call option by the issuer,
or, more broadly, discrete variables that determine whether the security is
convertible or not, if it is convertible to common stock or debt, etc.
Let us start with a general random value function for the i¡th …rm in a
given period, t. If a …rm chooses some variety j its value depends on how
11Some securities can also be grouped into categories of similar intruments, i.e., what
I referred to above as “families ”. For example, SIRENS or ICONS are dividend paying
convertible debt instruments, while ELKS or YEELDS are zero-coupon intruments with
principal payment tied to the appreciation of a given stock portfolio. I do not deal with
this prior level of classi…cation in the theoretical model but we do account for proximity
of securities between di¤erent groups in the econometric model.
9the security has been engineered, i.e., on µj; and its “net income” after the
fee is paid. Let this value function be denoted by
uijt = u(yit ¡ pjt;µjt;qt;²t)+"ijt: (1)
Note that this value function has already been maximized with respect
to other goods, that have prices q:12 As shown by McFadden (1981), this
function is continuous in y ¡ p and µ and twice continuously di¤erentiable
in the same arguments provided that the function is continuous and twice
continuously di¤erentiable in other goods and in µ:
²t is assumed to be an observable economy-wide shock that varies in
time and changes the preferences temporarily. It can be thought of as, for
example, a sudden urge for cash or a period of unusual underpricing of new
issues. The term "ijt is assumed to be an additive random component that
captures the random preferences of a given …rm for a particular variety.
It is unobservable to underwriters, and distributed independently with a
continuously di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function, G("):
3.1.3 Underwriters
At each period underwriters engineer and price their own varieties of secu-
rities such that they maximize their pro…ts. I assume that underwriters are
Bertrand-Nash competitors in prices and µ. Their pro…ts are given by
¼jt = pjtqjt ¡ c(qjt); (2)
where the demand for the particular variety j is




and c(:) is the total cost, such that c0(:) ¸ 0: The demand for a particular
variety is a function of the prices of all varieties the vector µ; and the ob-
servable economy-wide shocks. The set Aj(u) is the set of all the possible
realizations of these shocks, ("i1;:::;"iJ); such that uij > uik; k 6= j; i.e., the
set of all the states of nature that lead an issuer to a choice of variety j: M is
a measure of the total number of …rms, so that qj is obtained by multiplying
M by the share of …rms that choose j of the total number of …rms that want
to raise capital.
12We will drop this argument for what remains of this paper to avoid unnecessary
complications.
10Thenext proposition will simplify our work signi…cantly. It shows that an
underwriter’s choice of µj that maximizes each …rm’s individual utility con-
ditional on its available information also maximizes the underwriter’s pro…ts.
I assume that u(:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave.





I prove this proposition in the appendix, but the intuition is very simple.
Since the unobservable component of utility is independent of the character-
istics of the security and consumers taste shocks are independent, then the
aggregate demand for a variety j is strictly increasing in the utility of any
issuer. I have derived this result now because it allows me to eliminate µj
from the issuers’ value function, by substituting the optimal choice of µj:
The objective in the next section is to explain how that choice di¤ers across
underwriters with di¤erent information sets and, as a consequence, how the
value of …rms di¤ers depending on the chosen underwriter.13
3.1.4 Asymmetric Information
The crucial feature that distinguishes an innovator from an imitator in this
paper is that innovators exploit an informational asymmetry and are able to
sign the largest share of …rms using the security they invented while sustain-
ing rents in equilibrium. In this paper I do not provide a model that explains
why moving …rst gives the innovator an advantage, as Herrera and Schroth
(2000) do. Instead, I take as given that innovators will possess an advantage
over imitators and formalize it in this theory section to derive a the reduced
form that will be taken to the data.
Let £0 2 £ be the prior (common) knowledge set of all the possible
characteristics that a security can have, and uijt the utility function in (1),
which is also common knowledge to all underwriters at some point in time.
To relate this abstraction to the case of equity-linked or derivative securities,
imagine £0 as a set of all possible engineering choices for a security before
convertible debt was invented. Before the …rst innovation, debt securities
would be zero coupon or would have paid a …xed or a ‡oating rate, so any
vector in £0 would have zero entries for other characteristics yet to be used,
e.g., for convertibility to common stock.
13The reader may have noticed already that this approach is equivalenet to the derivation
of an indirect utility function.
11If an underwriter spends resources on R&D to come up with a new se-
curity, it will discover new possible combinations of characteristics a …rm
may …nd valuable, possibly changing zero entries to add new dimensions to
the structure of a security. The PERC, for example, was the …rst issue of
preferred stock convertible to common stock with capped and ‡oored ap-
preciation. This new set of possible engineering choices must be tied to the
discovery of …rms’s preferences for some previously non-existent feature of a
security. In the case of the PERC, its innovator, Morgan Stanley, …gured out
that in the uncertain environment for investment in late 1991, an issue of a
PERC would allow …rms to attract investors with stable high yields, pricing
the o¤er better than common stock while capping the security’s appreciation
potential (Pratt, 1991).
De…nition 2 An innovation is a new security g; tied to two private discov-
eries:
(i) a set £g ½ £ such that £g ¡ £0 6= fÁg; and
(ii) a decomposition of unobservable preferences for a variety k of g
"ik = º(µk;²;:) +e "ik:
Based on this de…nition, after an investment bank invests on R&D it
discovers some systematic component, º(:); in the previously random term
of any issuers’ preferences, ". This component depends on the engineering of
the security, µ; andona time-variant economy-wideshock,². This component
of utility can also depend on new attributes of the µ vector, i.e., it can be
de…ned for newer features of a security, that previously had a zero entry (e.g.,
convertibility of preferred stock, stock portfolio-tiedappreciation ofprincipal,
etc.). Thus, the innovator also enlarges its set of possible choices for µ.
Example 1 The Equity-Linked Security or ELK was the …rst debt product
to tie the repayment of principal to the stock price of another publicly traded
company. Based on our de…nition:
(i) the set of choices is now expanded with all the possible …rms that can
be chosen to tie their stock price to the repayment of principal, and
(ii) the discovered component º(µk;²;:) would be a function of how issuers’
cash ‡ows are correlated with each …rm whose stock price could be cho-
sen to be tied to the repayment of principal.
12When the …rst underwriting deal is made using a new security the in-
novator reveals a particular vector µ: The whole set of possible engineering
choices for this particular security, £g is kept private, though.
The goal now is to show that the optimal choices of µ for innovators and
imitators will di¤er, in general, andthis will be re‡ectedinthe value function
of a …rm signing an underwriting deal with either. Proposition 1 allows me
to eliminate the vector µ of the said function and express the indirect utility
as a function of the bank’s identity. To see this, note that what distinguishes
an innovator from an imitator is the set from which it can choose any µ: For
the innovator, this set is £0[ £g; and for the imitator this set is £0[µk: Let
us summarize the identity of an investment banks by
b =
½
1 if the underwriter is the innovator,
0 else, (4)
and let v(yi ¡ p;b;²) ´max
µ2£b u(yi ¡ p;µ;²):
Proposition 2 For any couple of varieties j;l of the same security g; if j is
issued by an innovator then vj(yi ¡ p;1;²) ¸vl(yi ¡ p;0;²).
The result is trivial. £1
g is the set of choices of the innovator and £0
g is




The Proposition above has established that given prices and economy-
wide shocks, innovators have an advantage over imitators. This advantage
can be measured by the additional value to issuers if they were to choose an
innovators’ variety. Let this di¤erence be named
¢vj ´ v(yi ¡ p;1;²)¡v(yi ¡ p;0;²): (5)
Note the importance of the time-variant shock. It provides the source of
variation that makes the optimal choice of µ; for a given security, change.
This is crucial, because otherwise the revelation of µ in the …rst deal would
su¢ce to make innovators and imitators identical in terms of their informa-
tion. Note too that an underwriting deal can be de…ned simpler than in
De…nition 1. Now it can be summarized by fj;i;b;pg:
This resultisconvenient for theestimationbecause whatIwant tocapture
is exactly the di¤erence in preferences for the di¤erent underwriters. Also,
working with a valuefunction, in which µ has beeneliminated, avoids losinga
large proportion of observations for which the full µ is not available. In other
words, my interest is to distinguish preferences for these two types of banks
more than to estimate the marginal valuation (and the derived elasticities)
13for a given characteristic of a security, e.g., years of call protection, yield
advantage, etc.
Another reason is that preferences for the choices of each attribute in µ
may be complicatedfunctions that make the estimation di¢cult. Thus, using
a simpler function that summarizes all the attributes seems reasonable. This
approach has been used by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991), who use a utility
function that is linear in functions that map the dimensions of the product
characteristics onto a di¤erent space. Using their own example, the bene…ts
of a car could include only comfort and speed, but these could be more
complicated functions of the physical attributes of the car.
3.1.5 Market Shares in Equilibrium
Here I discuss what Proposition 2 implies for the equilibrium in the market
for underwriting. In this type of setup with di¤erentiated products, there is
a demand function for each variety. The next proposition establishes that,
ceteris paribus, the demand for an innovator’s variety of a given security is
bigger than the demand for an imitator’s variety of the same product.
Proposition 3 Proposition 2 implies that for two varieties j;k of the same
security g and for a …xed vector of underwriting spreads, p 2 <J
+ such that
pj = pk then
qj(p;:) ¸qk(p;:)
if j is the innovator’s variety.
I prove this proposition in the appendix. Note that if ¢vj > 0 then the
proposition above holds with a strict inequality.
Iwill notshowformally that inequilibrium innovators havebigger within-
securities market shares than imitators. In fact, it is not obvious that this
will be the equilibrium outcome. It is true though that, under mildregularity
conditions on G(:) and v(:), the game becomes one of strategic complemen-
tarity.14 Moreover, if the best response function of the innovator “shifts
right” if his advantage is positive, i.e., if ¢v > 0; and if marginal costs are
the same among underwriters then in equilibrium the innovator will charge
a larger underwriting spread for his variety of the same security higher and
14Su¢cient conditions for strategic complementarity would be that
@ 2qj
@pj@pk > 0 and
@ qj
@pk > 0: The latter condition is obvious just by inspecting the aggregate demand (see
appendix). The former will be met if v(:) is not too concave.
14have a larger market share within that security. If this advantage eventu-
ally decreases, then the innovator’s equilibrium price should decrease and
converge to a symmetric equilibrium as the advantage goes to zero.15
3.2 The Econometric Model
Iarguedabove that themarket ofunderwritingnewissues usingequity-linked
securities and other corporate derivatives may be well approached as one of
di¤erentiated products. Each variety o¤ered is given by a combination of a
security structure ornameandtheidentity ofanunderwriter. Inthis section I
present the model that I take to the data. This model will be a reduced form
equation obtained from aggregating the individual …rms’ demands for the
di¤erent varieties. Iestablishdi¤erent sets ofassumptions for theaggregation
of individual …rm demands, and the results will be di¤erent reduced forms
to estimate: the multinomial logit and the nested logit demand models, each
one requiring a di¤erent method of estimation.
3.2.1 The General Setup
I consider each time period t = 1;:::;T a di¤erent market in which an issuer
i 2 It chooses its desired variety j 2 Jt: As the standard of the empirical
literature of discrete models of demand, I will specify the value of this issuer
as a function of observed and unobserved characteristics of the issuer and of
the product o¤ered by the underwriter, and of the relevant parameters. Let








it + "ijt: (6)
I assume that the value of net income is separable and linear. In other
words, I am imposing that preferences are quasi-linear and as a consequence
wealth e¤ects are ruled out (® would be the (constant) marginal utility of
income). This assumption is not only tractable and convenient for the es-
timation but quite reasonable for some types of products.16 I believe this
assumption is justi…ed for this particular data set: the amount paid in un-
derwriting fees is small relative to the value of the outstanding equity of
15The su¢cient conditions for this would be that
@qj
@¢v > 0 and
@2qj
@qj@¢v: Again, the
former holds and it is veri…ed just by inspecting the aggregate demand function. The
latter condition is met only under certain assumptions about G(:) and v(:):
16Nevo (2000) argues that it is reasonable to assume quasi-linearity for ready-to-eat
cereal because their price represents a small share of household expenditures. By the
same token, it is not reasonable to make this assumption for the demand of cars. In fact,
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use a Cobb-Douglas utility function, i.e., the additive
term for net income is ® log(yit ¡ pjt):
15issuers (the 95th percentile of the ratio of fees to equity is 0.02) or to their
yearly earnings (the median proportion of fees of the yearly earnings is 0.06;
the third quartile is 0.21).
The second term captures the indicators that distinguish an innovator
from an imitator. The vector xjt is then an index of ¢vj that will include
all the variables that re‡ect di¤erences in the information owned by under-
writers. As we shall see below, I will not only employ dummy variables that
capture the preference …rms have, on average for investment banks with su-
perior information. I will also try to identify the dynamics of this advantage
by interacting the identity of banks with the number of time periods after
the security has been imitated, and the order in which the security appears
within its “family”. I will also account for the fact that banks may acquire
reputation as experienced underwriters of this type of securities based on
their history as innovators within a family or any other type of equity-linked
or derivative corporate security.
This approach di¤ers from the existing empirical literature of discrete
choice because the interest of most of the studies has been to estimate the
elasticities of demand of the di¤erent characteristics of the goods (e.g. of
sugar content, in the case of cereals, or miles per gallon, in the case of cars).
Here the goal is to identify di¤erent preferences for innovators and imitators,
not to identify the elasticities with respect to certain characteristics, so xjt
summarizes the engineering of the security in a set of characteristics of the
underwriter.
Given the separability imposed above, the utility of choosing alternative
j to raise capital can be decomposed into its mean, ±jt = ¡®pjt + xjt¯+ »jt




it + "ijt: The unobservable
(to the econometrician) characteristics of the security j itself are captured by
»j; while the deviation term is used to account for the heterogeneity of …rms
preferences. The individual preference shocks, ºk
it interact with every char-
acteristic of the security to obtain di¤erent marginal utilities for attributes










and depends on the …rm level preference shock.
"ijt wouldbea purely idiosyncratic, mean zero, shock. BelowIwill explain
brie‡y the di¤erent ways Iwill estimate the parameters of the value function.
163.2.2 Logit Demand
Berry (1994) shows that if we make some assumptions about the unobserved
components and distributional assumptions about "ijt we can identify the
parameters of a simpli…ed version of (6) using the observed market shares
of all varieties, j: Note that the market share is the proportion of …rms that






it is zero for every variety, i.e., no random coe¢-
cients, andthat "ijt has a density function f(") = exp(¡exp(¡")) the market
shares predicted by the model, b sjt; which are obtained by integrating all the
realizations of unobservables that leadto a choice of j over all other varieties,







Note that the average utility of the outside alternative is normalized to zero
(±0t = 0) and that the term ®yit drops out because it is common to all
the choices. The logit formula has the property that the market shares are
uniquely pinned down by the average utility of a choice j: Thus, ® and ¯
can be obtained from a regression of the di¤erence of the logarithms of the
observed market share of j and an outside alternative, on xjt and pjt; e.g.:
lnsjt ¡ lns0t = ¡®pjt + xjt¯ +»jt: (9)
The estimation of this model is simple. The challenge is to …nd appro-
priate instruments for the price because it is very likely that it is correlated
with the unobservables, »jt: This is a typical problem found in studies that
use product characteristics as regressors. In this case, xjtuses issuers’ char-
acteristics that summarize the full description of the product, so it is less
likely that »jt contains product unobservables correlated with the price.
There may still be other costs of imposing this particularly convenient
structure. As a consequence of assuming that the "ijt are independent and
homoskedastic, the odds ratios of choosing one variety over another do not
depend on the value of other varieties. This can be problematic: suppose
the demand for MIPS were evenly split between Goldman, Sachs and Merrill
Lynch, and each were half the demand for Salomon Brother’s ELKS. This
model would predict that the ratio of the market share of Goldman’s MIPS
to Salomon’s ELKS wouldstill be one half, even if Merrill increases its under-
writing fee by any magnitude. Implicitly, the business lost by Merrill Lynch
wouldbeabsorbed by both Goldman and Salomon so as to preserve the ratio,
17never mind that Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch o¤er close varieties and
Salomon o¤ers a di¤erent product.
3.2.3 Nested Logit
The nested logit allows a richer pattern of substitution than the simple logit
and at a small additional computational cost. The decision to choose a
variety is now represented by a tree as in Figure 8. The preferences of …rms
are allowed to be correlated within groups. In this case, di¤erent varieties
of the same securities o¤ered by di¤erent investment banks would be closer
substitutes of each other than any other security.
In this case, the utility of agiven choice, j; can be modelled as a restricted
version of (6), allowing for random coe¢cients, ³ig; on security speci…c dum-
mies. Thus, we have
uijt = ±jt +
X
g
djg³ig + (1¡ ¾)"ijt; (10)
where djg = 1 if j 2 Jg; and "ijt is still assumed to be independently and
identically drawn from a Weibull distribution.
If the random coe¢cients are also assumed to be drawn from a Weibull
distribution, then so is the term ³ + (1 ¡ ¾)": The degree of within group
correlation is given by ¾ : if it approaches one then so does the within se-
curity correlation of utility levels, and if it approaches zero then there is no
within security correlation and we are back to the logit model. Due to this
assumption there is an analytical solution for the predicted market shares of




















Normalizing ±0 = 0; which implies D0 = 1 then ®;¯ and ¾ can be recov-
ered from an Instrumental Variables regression of the di¤erence of the logs
18of the observed market share of j and the outside alternative on xjt; pjt and
sj=gt because
lnsjt ¡ lns0t = ¾lnsj=gt ¡ ®pjt +xjt¯+ »jt: (14)
Again, instruments for prices and additional instruments for within security
market shares must be used to obtain consistent estimates because both
variables are endogenous.17
As I mentioned, this variation of the random indirect utility will allow
more reasonable substitution patterns. Let us inspect the price elasticities






















f for j 6= l; and j;l 2 Jg;
®plsl otherwise.
(15)
Cross-price elasticities for two di¤erent varieties within the same group will
be di¤erent than cross-price elasticities for varieties across di¤erent groups,
even if they have the same prices and market shares (provided that ¾ > 0).
Still, the cross-price elasticity of one variety with varieties of other groups
will be identical, even if one variety belongs to a group that is closer to the
other in terms of the uses of the security.
3.2.4 Issuer Heterogeneity
The two models above deal only with mean utility levels, ±; andassume away
the individual preference shocks. This imposed some undesirable restrictions
on the substitution patterns. To deal with this, I use data from COMPU-
STAT about all the …rms that did new issues using equity-linked security
in the sample. This will introduce issuer heterogeneity that will relax the
restrictions on cross-price elasticities in (15).
In this case, I consider a vector of f …rm characteristics vi; each one to
be interacted with the price to obtain the following estimable relationship:






As we shall see in the results, the cost is that we will lose a signi…cant
proportion of the observations in the sample. Many of the issuers of equity-
linked securities had no record in COMPUSTAT.
17See Berry (1994) for a proof.
193.3 The Data
As Imentioned before, the SDCDatabaseof New Issues records all the public
and some private o¤erings made since 1962. For securities de…ned in SDC
as equity-linked or derivative corporate securities there are 662 o¤erings up
to March 2001 (the …rst issue, a LYON, was made in April of 1985). There
are 50 securities and a total of 98 varieties. I compute the varieties’ market
shares over the whole market of new issues and over the varieties within the
security at di¤erent time periods.
I divide the whole sample in time periods rather than aggregate the data
by varieties over the whole time span studied. Overall aggregation would
reduce signi…cantly the number of observations (to 98) and would also elimi-
natethe time variationofmarket shares andunderwritingfees, compromising
seriously the consistency of the estimators. Thus, I treat each time period as
an independent market, so that there is a demandfunctionfor each variety at
each time. The parameters of this function are identi…ed by cross-sectional
variation in prices, in the identity of the underwriter, and the issuer’s char-
acteristics and by the time variation in prices and issuer “experience”. The
panel structure of the data is crucial since I want to study the dynamics of
the advantage to innovators.
To form the panel I must choose the length of each time period, though.
The shorter the length of each period increases the size of the usable data
set but increases the risk of aggregating very few or unique deals per period,
which would increase dramatically the variation in the market shares. To
avoid arbitrariness in the choice of the length I do the estimations at four
di¤erent levels of aggregation: using 16 periods (annually), 8 periods (bian-
nually), 11 periods (18 months) and 12 periods (16 months). In this way we
can also have an assessment of the robustness of the results to this choice.
The panel is unbalanced because not all securities are o¤ered at each
period. Only two varieties are o¤ered in the …rst period and 98 in the last. I
consider standard equity as the outside option to issuers, i.e., standardequity
is the variety j = 0: I approximate the total size of the market for new issues
using
M = q0 +q1 + :::+ qJ: (17)
The unit of demand is number of deals, not dollars underwritten. This
assumes that …rms set ex-ante the amount of cash they want to raise in
the o¤er, and the choice I model here is the choice of the security and the
underwriter.
203.3.1 Variables
Market Shares Overall market shares, sj; are the observed aggregate
number of deals for that variety ina given period divided by the total number
of new issues. Within-security market shares divide the number of deals by









Prices Prices of underwriting are the fees charged by the investment bank
that leads the syndicate of book managers of an o¤er. They are expressed as
a percentage of the principal underwritten and called underwriting spreads.
Usually this spread can be disaggregated in the underwriting fees and man-
agement fees. This disaggregation is seldom observable though, so the price
variable I will use is the total spread.19
Demand Shifters in xjt The demand shifters that do not exactly indicate
the information asymmetry between underwriters are variables about the
underwriter’s experience and reputation issuing this type of securities. I use
the total number of innovations in equity-linked products and innovations
within the particular family of the security accumulated by the underwriter.
I use time period dummies to control for observable economy-wide shocks
and group dummy variables.
Advantage to Innovators One way to test if innovators have advantages
on the revenue side is by including a dummy variable that equals one when
18In some periods, market shares of existing varieties are zero. The computation of
logit and nested logit models requires taking the logarithm if these shares. To avoid
the indeterminacy problem I use a transformation sj that does not alter its distribution
signi…cantly. I compute instead
lns¤
jt = ln(sjt + 0:00001);
lns¤
j=g = ln(sj=gt + 0:00001):
Excluding these observations would not only bias the sample selection but also imply a
loss of 191 observations that actually reveal that the demand was zero.
19For periods of zero market shares no information of the bids made by potential un-
derwirters is observed. Since these varieties were available to …rms, although none chose
to use them, we assume there is a going price for them. We approximate this price with
the last observed price for that variety.
21the underwriter was the …rst to issue that security. A positive estimate of the
coe¢cient of this variable would imply that, on average, …rms have stronger
preferences for innovators.
In the model presented above, the innovator has an advantage because it
holds private information about the security issued. However, this advantage
could diminish as more deals are completed by imitators. Thus, we would
expect the estimate of the coe¢cient ofthe innovator dummy interacted with
the number of deals after the security was imitated to be negative. Moreover,
if the security is a late generation of a given group, more information about
this type of securities would have been aggregated, and we would expect imi-
tators to learn the innovators private informationfaster. Thus, I also interact
this dummy with the generation number to get a richer characterization of
the dynamics of learning by doing.
Formally, I model these dynamics by specifying the component ¢vj of
the …rms utility as:
¢vjt = °0ij + °1ij ¤genj + °2ij ¤genj ¤ e t; (18)
where the dummy variable ij = 1 if the variety j is the innovator’s variety,
gen is the generation number of the security ande t thenumber oftime periods
since the …rst imitation.
Issuers Data Iuse …nancial data fromCOMPUSTAT’s quarterly database
that matches the period of the o¤er. I use the total market capitalization to
measure the size of the …rm. I also useindicators of common equity, preferred
equity, short term, long term debt and subordinated debt all expressed as
percentages of capitalization.
3.3.2 Instruments
Since it is very likely that the price is endogenous, instruments are needed
to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of the model. In the case
of the nested logit speci…cation, the within-securities market shares are used
as a regressor and these are possibly endogenous too. To choose appropriate
instruments I follow the suggestions of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and Berry(1994). Instruments for the underwriting spread (price) include
the averages of characteristics of the security over the competing varieties,
like years of call protection, years prior to call at par, percentage yield, which
should not be correlated with the error term since the advantage term sum-
marizes all characteristics of the security. By the same token instruments for
the within-security market shares include characteristics of other underwrit-
ers in the same group (e.g., total and within family accumulated innovations
22by the other underwriters of the same security). To test if these instru-




To serve as a benchmark, …rst, I …t the simplest, yet most restrictive, de-
mand model: the multinomial logit. I only report here the results for the
aggregation at 12 time periods for the sake of parsimony (the subsequent
estimations will include all aggregation levels to show the robustness of the
results). Table 8 reports the estimates of the parameters of (9), allowing
for unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes in the di¤erent varieties
and using an instrumental variables method to account for the correlation
between the price and the unobservables (the standard errors were estimated
using the Huber/White variance estimators, allowing for heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation within securities). I …t two models: one that only in-
cludes the innovator indicator from equation (18) (reported in the “Average
Advantage”column) andanother one that speci…es the full dynamics in (18).
I use time period-speci…c dummies and …xed e¤ects for the security group.
We can see, for both columns, that most estimates have the expected
sign. The average value to an issuer increases if the number of innovations
in equity-linked securities accumulated by its chosen underwriter increases.
The negative sign of the number of accumulated innovations within that
security’s group, though, is an unexpected anomaly.
The underwriter’s fee (the price) is signi…cant at the 90% level. Note
that I report the estimated ® (with positive sign) to be consistent with our
notation above, where the price component of utility appears as ¡®p: In
consistency with oligopolistic behavior, this estimate must produce price-
inelastic demands. In Table 9 I report the number of demands (of 323) that
violate this condition. Both logit models imply 50 and 49 inelastic demands,
respectively, out of 323 estimates. The average elasticity, though, is well
above 1.
In both columns, the innovator dummy has a positive coe¢cient, signif-
icant to the 99% level of con…dence, suggesting stronger preferences for the
innovator’s variety, ceteris paribus. The second column reveals an interesting
result. The coe¢cients on the innovator dummy, on the dummy interacted
with the generation number, and on the dummy interacted with the gen-
eration number and the time after imitation are all signi…cant to the 99%
23level of con…dence. The estimate of the coe¢cient of the …rst interaction
term, i ¤ gen; is positive, revealing that the later the generation, the higher
the average initial advantage of the innovator. The second interaction term,
i ¤ gen ¤e t; has a negative estimated coe¢cient, showing that this advantage
decreases in the number of periods that imitators have been in the market,
and that this advantage diminishes faster the later the generation.
The previous results assumed that varieties of the same security were as
close to each other in the product space as varieties of di¤erent securities.
Group dummies may have accountedfor proximity within the family, but not
within the security. The results that follow are for the nested logit model,
that deals with this problem.
4.2 Nested Logit Demand
The estimation procedure for the nested logit demand model is similar to
the one used for the multinomial logit. The di¤erence is that, here, I include
as a regressor the within-security market shares for each variety in order to
obtain an estimate of the intra-security substitution e¤ect. For this matter,
additional instruments must be used since the newregressor is believed to be
correlated with the variety’s unobservable characteristics. This model was
…tted for the four di¤erent aggregations of data: 8,11,12, and 16 periods.
The results are shown in Table 10.
The estimated coe¢cient of price still has the correct sign for all the
aggregations. It is signi…cant at least at the 95% level but for the case
where t = 8 (where its p-value is 0.115). The estimated elasticities increases
sharply after accounting for the proximity of varieties, and as a consequence
the implied number of inelastic demands is much smaller (10 at most).
The estimated coe¢cient for the substitution parameter is signi…cant in
all cases, andthe estimate is within the appropriate bounds, 0 and1 (0:615 <
b ¾ < 0:729). This result is consistent with the theoretical setup in which
varieties within a security type are closer substitutes than varieties outside
the security type: issuers switch bankers before using a di¤erent security
structure.
For all these cases I have …tted the model that describes the dynamics
of the innovator’s advantage. The estimates of the innovator’s advantage
component reveal the same dynamic pattern as before: the innovator dummy
has a positive estimated coe¢cient, as well as the dummy interacted with
the generation number. The coe¢cient of the interactions of the innovator
dummy with the generation number and the number of periods after the …rst
imitation is negative.
Figures 9 to 12illustrate better what the estimates for the dynamics of
24the advantage mean in terms of the time during which issuers value innova-
tor’s varieties more than imitators’. I plot the estimated advantage of the
innovator, i.e., the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market share to the
imitator’s (sIn
sIm), in the vertical axis against time, measured in years, in the
horizontal axis. We can see that, for all aggregations, the innovator of a …rst
generation security has the smallest initial advantage over his imitators. In
all cases, this advantage disappears slowly (in 12 years, on average). In sharp
contrast, an innovator of, say, a seventh generation security enjoys a bigger
average initial advantage over other competing underwriters. This advan-
tage, though, will be gone shortly after the product’s second year of having
been imitated (that happens when both market shares are predicted to be
equal to each other). One possible interpretation of this result is that late
generations are often very complicated modi…cations of existing securities.
At …rst it is di¢cult for imitators to learn how innovators are engineering
the deals, but in time they should learn faster given that more information
has been aggregated about the security type or of the family of securities.
Since I estimate this model using instrumental variables, I test if the
restrictions imposed by using the chosen instruments over-identify the pa-
rameters of the model (the F-statistic for the test and its p-value are also
reported in Table 10). The hypothesis that the model is over-identi…ed is
rejected in all aggregations but the last one, when the sample is split in 8
periods. Rejection may be due to the fact that the instruments chosen do
not introduce su¢cient independent variation themselves to account for the
variation in all the endogenous variables of the model (price and within-type
market shares). It is alsopossible that the model is not fully speci…ed and the
instruments themselves are correlated with other excluded exogenous vari-
ables. However, it is interesting that the model seems to be over-identi…ed
when each observation is the result of aggregating over 2 years and not less
(when t = 8). Thus, it is possible that within shorter intervals, the instru-
ments used are strongly correlated between themselves, while this may not
be the case for longer periods. It is also worth pointing out that, the rejec-
tion of over-identi…cation at some levels of aggregation is not strong evidence
against our choice of instruments, since the results are consistent over all the
aggregations (the over-identi…ed models and those that are seemingly not).
4.3 Issuers Heterogeneity
The estimation by instrumental variables ofthe logit andnestedlogitdemand
models above may have allowed us to obtain consistent estimates of the own-
price elasticity, but it may still yield implausible cross-price elasticities for
varieties in di¤erent groups. Also, the test of over-identifying restrictions
25for the nested logit speci…cation revealed that the model may still have not
been completely speci…ed. Below (Table 11), I show the results after adding
the characteristics of the issuer to the model via interactions with the price
variable. Although it is not my goal to estimate these cross-price elasticities,
adding heterogeneity will di¤erentiate own-price elasticities by the type of
…rms.
Although I lose observations when using issuers’ data, Table 11 shows
results that do not di¤er qualitatively to the previous ones. The same dy-
namic behavior of the innovators advantage is observed in all four cases. For
all aggregations over time, the initial advantage is bigger than in the pre-
vious speci…cation but it also decreases at a much faster rate. On average,
for all cases of the model with interactions, the advantage of each generation
wouldbegone almost by the time predicted in the nested logit model without
interactions (see Figure 13 for the case when t = 8):
Of the …ve issuers variables that I interact with price, only market cap-
italization and preferred stock as a percentage of market cap were found to
be signi…cant at a level higher than 90%. Their estimated coe¢cients were
both positive. One possible explanation is that market capitalization is an
approximation for the available sources of …nance to the issuer. Similarly,
since most of the varieties are forms of preferred stock or convertible to pre-
ferred stock, …rms with a larger proportion of this type of stock have more
available instruments toraise capital and thus their demands are more elastic
to underwriting spreads.
Even though estimates of the elasticity of demand are much higher, the
number of inelastic demands increases relative to the total number of usable
data points, most likely due to the large variation in the issuers characteris-
tics.
Although I added more regressors to the model, this did not change sub-
stantially the result for the tests of over-identifying restrictions. We still
cannot reject that the model is over-identi…ed in the case where t = 8.
Now, however, we obtain a similar result when the time periods are shortest
(t = 16). As before, although the model does not seem to be over-identi…ed
in all the cases, the estimates are consistent over all the estimations: the
implied elasticities for each speci…cation and the implied speeds at which
the innovator’s advantage diminishes do not di¤er signi…cantly across the
di¤erent time aggregations.
265 Summary
This paper has provided new evidence of the sources of …rst-mover advan-
tages in innovations in …nance. The existing empirical literature of …nancial
innovation identi…ed the following stylized fact: that investment banks are
able to pro…t from innovation despite being imitated almost immediately.
Whatever advantage they had over competitors, the clue to the pro…tabil-
ity of unpatentable innovation in …nance was that innovators were able to
underwrite the largest market shares of corporate initial o¤erings.
This paper has tried to provide an answer to the question of what is
the source of the advantage. For this purpose I used data of all the New
Issues using Equity-Linked and derivative corporate securities. This paper
has tested empirically the hypothesis that …rms have stronger preferences for
underwriters that are innovators, not imitators. The theoretical motivation
for this conjecture was the following: …rms that need to raise capital have
to use a security which is engineered by investment banks that act as under-
writers. If the underwriter is the innovator of the security, this signals he is
better informed about the choices that will be best for the …rm. On average,
the value to the …rm from doing the issue with the innovator will be larger.
To …nd an appropriate method to test this hypothesis I started by an-
alyzing preliminary evidence that suggested that innovations in corporate
products such as equity-linked securities are frequently improvements or gen-
erations of previous designs, so that families of securities could be identi…ed.
I also noted that banks o¤ered di¤erentiated underwriting services. Thus, I
used the discrete choice theory of product di¤erentiationas the framework to
model the decisions of …rms to choose security structures and underwriters.
The evidence also suggested that innovators hadadvantages that presumably
dissipated over time. Thus, I decidednot only to study the overall advantage
of innovators, but its dynamics.
For that purpose I speci…ed the value to a …rm for choosing a particular
security and a particular underwriter whose parameters were estimable. I
claimed that the advantage that the innovator had over its competitors in
the market to underwrite new issues can be summarized in an index that
included his identity, the time elapsed after the innovator was imitated, and
the generation of a security. Moreover, this index appeared directly in the
value function of a …rm because banks make di¤erent engineering choices
contingent on their private information.
Using data of all the new issues of corporate securities from the Securi-
ties Data Company Database I estimated the parameters of the dynamics
of the innovators’ advantage for multinomial logit and nested logit demand
models. I also used …nancial data from COMPUSTAT about the …rms that
27issued the securities in the sample to enrich the speci…cation. A result con-
sistent to all the speci…cations was that preferences for innovators are, on
average, stronger than for imitators. Interestingly, these preferences were
initially stronger the later generation of an innovation, possibly re‡ecting
the fact that late generations get more complex and are therefore harder to
understand to imitators. The preference for an innovator over an imitator
diminishes in time, possibly as a result of imitators catching up with inno-
vators. Further, the speed of the reduction in the preference for innovators
over imitators was larger for later generations. I interpreted this as the fact
that late generations appear naturally when more information has been ag-
gregatedabout thefamily of securities they belong to, making learning about
the innovator’s private information easier.
The scope of the paper has been limited by the availability of data. Cost
data was unavailable for most of the observations, making it unworthy to
estimate the model jointly with a pricing equation. This would have also
allowed to test if innovators and imitators have di¤erent marginal costs for
underwriting o¤ers, another potential source of …rst-mover advantages.
This paper has also taken innovation as exogenous. The set of choices
available to …rms was taken as given at each time. Certainly, one interesting
way to continue this line of research would be to identify the preferences of
…rms for new securities at each time they make their choices. If the choices
of the …rm were to choose a security of a set of already existing securities or
to rather choose to be the …rst issuer of a new security, then the data in each
deal could reveal what determines when an innovation is to be introduced.
28APPENDIX
Proofof Proposition 1. The value ofchoosingvariety j is u(µj;:)+"ij:
Thus, given the properties of u(:); if µ¤







j;:) = 0; (19)
where µ
m
j corresponds to each entry of the µj vector.
To …nd the pro…t maximizing choices, let us …rst solve for the demand
function for some variety j, as given in (3). Note …rst that the probability
that an arbitrary issuer chooses variety j over any other variety k is
Pr(uij ¸ uik) = Pr("ik · u(µj) ¡ u(µk) +"ij)
= G(u(µj)¡ u(µk) + "ij):
Further, since each "ik is drawn independently from G(:); the probability
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is only satis…ed when um(µj) = 0 8m and that is only when µj = µ
¤
j:
Proof of Proposition 3. Let j andk;l be varieties of the same security
g, and q an arbitrary variety of another arbitrary security. By Proposition 2
vj(y ¡ p;1;:) ¸ vk(y ¡ p;0;:);
vj(y ¡ p;1;:) ¸ vl(y ¡ p;0;:):
The aggregate demand for the innovator’s variety, given than varieties of













G(v(y¡ p;1;:) ¡ v(y ¡ pq;b;:) + "
0)dG("
0):











G(v(y ¡ p;0;:)¡ v(y ¡ pq;b;:) +"
0)dG("
0):
Clearly, since G(:) is a strictly increasing function, by Proposition 2
G(¢vg +"0) ¸ G(¡¢vg + "0);
G(v(y ¡ p;1;:)¡ v(y ¡ pl;0;:) +"0) ¸
G(v(y ¡ p;0;:)¡ v(y ¡ pl;0;:) + "
0);
and G(v(y ¡ p;1;:) ¡v(y¡ pq;b;:) +"
0) ¸
G(v(y ¡ p;0;:)¡ v(y ¡ pq;b;:) +"0):
and thus
qj(p;:) ¸qk(p;:):
Note that if ¢vg > 0; then qj(p;:) >qk(p;:).
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Figure 1: Principal Underwritten Using Tax-Deductible Preferred Products












































































































































































Figure 5: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using Trust-
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Figure 8: The decision tree of an issuer of a corporate security. The issuer




















































Figure 9: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations




















































Figure 10: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations
















































Figure 11: Estimated Advantage of theInnovator over Timeand Generations

















































Figure 12: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations





















































Figure 13: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations
(nested logit with issuer heterogeneity; t = 8)
40Table 1: Sizes of the NewIssues Markets using Standard Equity and Equity-
Linked Products between April 1985 and March 2001
Time Underwritten Principal Average Deal Size
Period Standard Equity-Linked and Standard Equity-Linked and
Equity Derivative Products Equity Derivative Products
1 64;477 3;915 38 489
2 61;034 590 36 84
3 35;801 4;120 48 589
4 45;123 9;314 46 388
5 61;216 19;517 57 887
6 99;507 10;750 57 336
7 129;073 22;106 56 287
8 90;397 22;414 56 270
9 139;518 32;357 61 225
10 169;569 35;463 83 269
11 143;016 19;616 112 265
12 230;734 20;680 381 440
Figures in millions of current US$
Aggregation over 12 periods between April 1985 and March 2001.
41Table 2: Classi…cation of Equity Linked and Derivative Corporate Securites
Family Description Securities in the Family
Debt Products RISRS.
Zero Coupon-Convertible Debt LYONS.
Dividend Paying Convertible Debt SIRENS, ICONS.
Convertible Preferred Securities
PERCS, YES Shares, DECS, ACES, X-Caps, 
PRIDES, PEPS, SAILS, Automatic Common 
Exchange Securities, STRYPES, MARCS, PEPS, 
MEDS, Trust-Originated Convertible Preferreds, 
TRACES. 
Short Term Tax-Advantage Preferred FRAPS.
Tax-Advantage Preferred or Debt
MIPS, EPICS, MIDS, TOPRS, QUIDS, QUIPS, 
QUICS, Res-Caps, COPRS.
Convertible Tax-Advantage
Convertible MIPS, TECONS, Convertible TOPRS, 
QDCs, EPPICS, TRUPS, Convertible QUIPS.
Index-tied Principal
PERLS, SIRS, MITTS, SMARTS, Equity 
Participation Securities, CPNs, SUNS, CUBS.
Stock Appreciation Tied-Principal ELKS, YEELDS, CHIPS, PERQS.
Privatization Exchangeable Debt PENs.
Trust-Originated Pass-Throughs STOPS.











RISRS Kemper Securities 1 43 No 50
Yes 
(Tied)




1 94 Yes 79 Yes
Equity Participation 
Securities
Merrill Lynch 1 94 Yes 50
Yes 
(Tied)
MIDS Goldman, Sachs 2 29 No (2) 30 No (2)
SMART Notes Merrill Lynch 2 60 Yes 41 Yes




2 82 Yes 90 Yes
PERCS Morgan Stanley 2 82 Yes 88 Yes
QIDS Goldman, Sachs 2 82 Yes 76 Yes
PERLS Morgan Stanley 2 93 Yes 97 Yes
LYONS Merrill Lynch 2 97 Yes 95 Yes
FRAPS Merrill Lynch 3 22 No (2) 23 No (2)
RST-CAPS Lehman Brothers 3 25 Yes (Tied) 22 No (2)
MIPS Goldman, Sachs 3 89 Yes 96 Yes
TOPRS Merrill Lynch 3 95 Yes 92 Yes
TRUPS Salomon Brothers 4 71 Yes 72 Yes
Convertible TOPRS Merrill Lynch 6 47 Yes 33 No (2)
Trust-Originated 
Convertible Preferreds
Robertson 7 6 No (5) 5 No (4)
15 14 Total Number of Leads (of 18 cases)
43Table 4: Ratio of Principal Underwritten by Imitators to Innovators
Imitated Securities (number) Average Ratio
First Generation (7) 0.337
All Generations (18) 0.679




O¤er Yield to Maturity 0:052
Yield Advantage 0:025
Years before Called at Par 0:203
Percentage Yield 0:001
Years of Call Protection 0:543
Initial Call Price 0:001
Conversion Shares per Preferred Share 0:943
Table 6: Within-Standard Deviation of Some Security Characteristics for
Innovators and Imitators
Variable / Available Observations Imitators Innovators
O¤er Yield to Maturity 0:779 12:949
N 46 418
Spread over Treasury Bills 25:420 87:528
N 10 31
Years of Call Protection 4:055 1:772
N 31 407
Years to Par Call 1:043 2:703
N 23 296
Yield Advantage 0:840 3:610
N 8 167
Percentage Yield 0:858 15:569
N 35 288
44Table 7: Paired Di¤erence of Means Test for Imitators’ Innovator’s Under-
writing Spreads
Paired Mean Standard P-value
Di¤erence Error (Mean < 0)
Imitator - Innovator Spread -0.063 0.0573 0.137
Table 8: Estimation Results with Logit Demand
Dependent variable is ln(sj)¡ ln(so):
Regressions include time and group dummies.
Instruments are other varieties’ characteristics..
Huber/White’s Consistent Estimators for Standard Errors
(with heteroskedasticity and within-security correlation)
Parameter Average Dynamics of
Estimates Advantage Advantage
® 0:735¤¤¤ 0:783¤¤¤
Total Innovations 0:075¤¤ 0:842¤¤
Total Innovations in Group ¡0:359¤¤ ¡0:361¤¤
Issuer is Innovator 2:010¤ 4:433¤
- interacted with generation number ¡ 0:177¤
- interacted with deal number and generation ¡ ¡0:334¤
Number of Observations 323 323
Adjusted R-squared 0:292 0:324
F-statistic 1587:64¤ 11:85¤
P-values: ¤ · 0:01;¤¤· 0:05;¤¤¤· 0:1:





Standard Error 0:797 0:850
Number of Inelastic Demands 50 49
Table 10: IV estimates for the base Nested Logit Demand Model
Dependent Variable is ln(sjt)¡ ln(s0t)
All regressions include time and group dummies.
Instruments are other varieties’ characteristics and other bank’s characteristics.
Huber/White’s Consistent Estimators for Standard Errors
(with hetersokedasticity and within-security correlation)
Parameters t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
® 1:598¤¤ 1:025¤¤ 1:025¤¤¤ 1:85
¾ 0:631¤ 0:691¤¤ 0:615¤¤¤ 0:729¤
Innovations by Bank 0:250 0:042¤¤¤ 0:045¤¤¤ 0:023
Innovator Dummy 2:657¤ 2:824¤ 2:474¤¤¤ 3:068¤¤¤
- interacted with:
generation number 0:110¤ 0:160¤ 0:114¤ 0:128¤
generation number and time ¡0:192¤¤ ¡0:318¤ ¡0:303¤ ¡0:500¤¤
n 418 323 312 225
OIR test 20:399 14:567 28:579 10:801
(p-value) (0:007) (0:024) (0:000) (0:303)
Inelastic demands 9 10 10 4
Average Elasticity 11:064 8:227 7:503 16:812
(standard error) (4:729) (3:596) (2:899) (7:649)
Adjusted R2 0:145 0:290 0:273 0:065
F-statistic 330:11¤ 12:30¤ 11:39¤ 248:05¤
P-values: ¤ · 0:01;¤¤· 0:05;¤¤¤· 0:1:
46Table11: IVestimates for theNestedLogitDemandwithFirmHeterogeneity
Dependent Variable is ln(sjt)¡ ln(s0t)
All regressions include time and group dummies.
Instruments are other varieties’ characteristics and other bank’s characteristics.
Huber/White’s Consistent Estimators for Standard Errors
(with hetersokedasticity and within-security correlation)
Parameters t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
® 1:966¤¤ 1:918¤¤ 0:933¤¤¤ 1:417¤¤¤
¾ 0:510 0:655¤¤¤ 0:887¤¤ 0:610¤¤¤
Innovator Dummy 5:751¤ 5:379¤ 4:335¤¤¤ 5:824¤
- interacted with generation number 0:155¤ 0:209¤ 0:009¤¤ 0:172¤
- interacted with generation number and time ¡0:396 ¡0:525¤ ¡0:532¤ ¡0:847¤
Price interacted with:
Market Capitalization 1:39e¡5¤ 2:22e¡5¤ 1:25e¡5¤¤¤ 3:04e¡5¤
Proportion of Preferred Stock 0:059¤ 0:038¤ 0:018¤ 0:047¤¤¤
n 299 261 250 177
OIR test 2:392 16:078 28:579 6:584
(p-value) (0:972) (0:050) (0:000) (0:708)
Inelastic demands 9 7 7 5
Average Elasticity 9:632 13:863 20:775 8:907
(standard error) (0:972) (6:269) (9:424) (4:259)
Adjusted R2 0:295 0:128 0:270 0:345
F-statistic 175:56¤ 5:96¤ 8:98¤
P-values: ¤ · 0:01;¤¤· 0:05;¤¤¤· 0:1:
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